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Swanson v Citibank and the 1L Canon
William H.J. Hubbard†
INTRODUCTION
Part of what’s special about teaching 1Ls is that 1L year initiates law students into the community of lawyers. This community not only shares a common set of professional commitments
and qualifications. Thanks to their 1L courses, lawyers share familiarity with a pantheon of famous cases that have been taught
for decades. These canonical cases connect the law school experiences of generations of lawyers.
Civil procedure has its share of these classics. Virtually every
first-year law student learns the Strawbridge rule for federal diversity jurisdiction.1 International Shoe is part of every 1L’s vocabulary.2 And no law student who learns it forgets the name Erie
Railroad Co v Tompkins.3 We insist on teaching Hickman v Taylor,4 a gem of a case but much of which, at least strictly speaking,
has been superseded by amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.5
For 1Ls taking civil procedure in the past decade, no cases
have loomed as large in their collective imagination as Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly6 and Ashcroft v Iqbal.7 This pair of cases—
known (dis)affectionately by the portmanteau “Twiqbal”—established the doctrine of “plausibility pleading” for federal civil
† Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. I thank Emily Buss and
Tony Casey for their comments and insights. Sterling Coleman-Selby provided excellent
research assistance.
1
See generally Strawbridge v Curtiss, 7 US (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). Past cohorts of
Judge Diane Wood’s students learned the Strawbridge rule on the first day of class.
2
See generally International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310 (1945).
3
304 US 64 (1938).
4
329 US 495 (1947).
5
Every casebook I know (including my own) features Hickman. Hickman established work product protection in federal court, but work product protection is now defined
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). Rule 26(b)(3) was added in the 1970 amendments and largely codified Hickman, although it also resolved court splits on ambiguities
in and questions left open by Hickman. See FRCP 26, Notes of the Advisory Committee on
Rules–1970 Amendment, Note to Subdivision (b)(3).
6
550 US 544 (2007).
7
556 US 662 (2009).
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actions. Twombly and Iqbal are broadly understood to have raised
the bar for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss in federal
court. Plausibility pleading immediately became a staple of the
case reporters and an essential topic in every 1L civil procedure
course. Over the decade-plus since they came down, Twombly and
Iqbal have been the subject of near-universal condemnation in
the academy for their incomplete reasoning, lack of grounding in
the federal rulemaking process, and anticipated devastating effect on plaintiffs facing motions to dismiss.
But what Twombly and Iqbal need is not denouncement but
denouement. For 1Ls trying to understand the Rules and the
workings of the US courts, Twombly and Iqbal are a poor prescription for progress. Their fuzzy reasoning leaves students perplexed at what, if anything, the legal rule actually is. And the
gathering gloom they portend leaves students to speculate about
lower courts in chaos.
Of course, if this really were the state of affairs in federal
court, then civil procedure teachers would be duty bound to make
these the lessons of Twiqbal for students. But this isn’t the state
of affairs—at least not where it matters most. The Supreme Court
may be supreme, but the “inferior” courts are the business end of
Article III. For every federal action decided by the Supreme
Court, there are more than six thousand actions resolved in the
lower federal courts,8 and from an access-to-justice perspective,
how cases are handled in these lower courts is what matters to
the vast majority of plaintiffs, who lack the combination of resources and exceptional legal theories sufficient to reach the Supreme Court.9 Plaintiffs, in other words, like Gloria Swanson.
Swanson, proceeding pro se, was the plaintiff in Swanson v
Citibank, N.A.10 She alleged that Citibank’s denial of her

8
Adam Feldman, Final Stat Pack for October Term 2018 (SCOTUSblog, June 28,
2019), archived at https://perma.cc/PC6A-PHVW (counting sixty-one merits decisions by
the Supreme Court in October Term 2018 that originated in federal court); Administrative
Office of the US Courts, U.S. District Courts – Judicial Business 2018, archived at
https://perma.cc/FAV9-SMXU (reporting 370,085 civil and criminal cases filed in the US
district courts in 2018).
9
By their very nature, cases decided by the Supreme Court are atypical. It selects
cases for unusually difficult issues, important fact patterns, or even particularly distinguished advocates. Professor Suja Thomas has labeled Twombly and Iqbal “oddball” cases,
see generally Suja A. Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and Employment Discrimination, 2011 U Ill L Rev 215, and there is no doubt that their enormous stakes and implications for national security and separation of powers, respectively, rendered them unrepresentative cases.
10 614 F3d 400 (7th Cir 2010).
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application for a home equity loan was the product of race discrimination and sought damages under the Fair Housing Act
(FHA).11 The district court judge dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, but the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by
Judge Diane Wood, reversed. My claim in this Essay is that, at
least for teachers of civil procedure, Swanson belongs in the canon
of 1L civil procedure cases alongside Twombly and Iqbal.
Casebooks prioritize Supreme Court decisions for obvious
reasons. But an excessive focus on the Supreme Court misses an
important part of how our hierarchical court systems operate. For
every climactic Supreme Court decision, there is long aftermath
in which lower court judges do the dirty work of sorting through
the often-nebulous directions from the Court and making the law
happen for millions of plaintiffs and defendants.
Swanson exemplifies this. In a concise opinion, Judge Wood
rationalizes the muddle of pronouncements in Twombly and Iqbal
and grounds the doctrine in the text of Rule 8. Swanson does a
better job teaching 1Ls pleading rules than Twombly or Iqbal and
does so in a context closer to the kinds of cases most students will
encounter as lawyers or judges. It shows that liberal pleading has
life after Twiqbal and provides an opportunity for students to reflect on the extent to which, even in a hierarchical court system,
the common law process of continuous but incremental change
still operates.
And Swanson was a hard case. Judge Richard Posner dissented and argued that, in reversing the dismissal of the complaint, the majority misread Twombly and Iqbal and got the outcome wrong. Swanson gives students a simple—yet balanced—
case, perfect for debate and reflection. When I teach Swanson, students routinely split on the proper outcome. Perhaps Judge Posner
is more faithful to the language of Twombly and Iqbal, but perhaps
Judge Wood is more faithful to the terms and history of Rule 8.
In this Essay, I argue that Swanson is the rare case that belongs in the 1L canon. Part I briefly reviews the doctrine on federal civil pleading and introduces Swanson. I then show how
Swanson can serve as the centerpiece of a discussion about

11 42 USC § 3605. Swanson also brought claims alleging common law fraud and violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 USC § 1691(a)(1). The ECOA
claims were dropped on appeal, see Swanson, 614 F3d at 405–06, and the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the fraud claims under Rule 9(b)’s heightened
pleading standard, see id at 406–07.
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pleading doctrine, judging, and legal change. Part II provides an
epilogue to Twombly and Iqbal, showing that Swanson was right
to say that the story of plausibility pleading is a story of continuity, not discontinuity, in doctrinal evolution. Part III presents my
attempt at synthesizing current pleading doctrine, with a heavy
dose of reliance on Swanson. Part IV concludes with thoughts on
Swanson’s pedagogical value as a close case.12
I. PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING AND SWANSON
The basic regime for pleading in a federal civil action is familiar, and I will only briefly sketch it here. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that, to avoid dismissal for failure to
state a claim, a complaint “must contain . . . a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”13 In the seminal Supreme Court case, Conley v Gibson,14 the
Court made clear that the gatekeeping function of federal judges
was limited: “notice pleading” requires only that the complaint
“give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests.”15
Fifty years later, Twombly ushered in a new era in federal
pleading, with the Court emphasizing that a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.”16 Two years later, in Iqbal, the Court reiterated that “only
a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”17 While Twombly did not claim to introduce a new
approach to pleading, but rather to clarify the meaning of
Rule 8(a)(2), these cases came as a shock to the bar and legal
academy alike. Scholars saw a revolution underway and decried
“plausibility pleading” as a “radical departure from prior practice.”18 Twombly, Iqbal, and plausibility pleading have been intensely controversial ever since.19
12 Although this Essay extracts three main ideas from Swanson, there are plenty
more. This is part of what makes Swanson so useful for teaching. Judge Wood’s opinion
also tees up discussions of discovery costs, asymmetric information in litigation, and the
appropriateness of the formal rulemaking process when changing pleading standards.
13 FRCP 8(a)(2).
14 355 US 41 (1957).
15 Id at 47 (quotation marks omitted).
16 Twombly, 550 US at 570.
17 Iqbal, 556 US at 679.
18 Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 Duke L J 1, 22, 28 (2010).
19 The literature spawned by Twombly and Iqbal is too vast to cite. For an early
survey, see Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 Stan L Rev 1293, 1305 (2010). I
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Notwithstanding the enduring controversy over Twombly
and Iqbal and uncertainty about what makes a claim “plausible,”
the Supreme Court had spoken. It fell to the lower federal courts
to make sense of these new precedents. In the years since Iqbal,
the lower federal courts have heard hundreds of thousands of motions to dismiss and appeals from rulings on motions to dismiss.
One such appeal was Swanson v Citibank.
***
Swanson was a simple case. Gloria Swanson, an African
American woman proceeding pro se, sued Citibank and Citibank’s
house appraisers for discrimination on the basis of race.20 Swanson had sought a home equity loan from Citibank in February
2009.21 Citibank conditionally approved her application, but her
house was appraised for a lower amount ($170,000) than Swanson had estimated in her loan application ($270,000), and Citibank rejected the application.22 In her complaint, she pointed to
facts from which she inferred racial discrimination: Her initial
request to apply was turned away by a Citibank employee named
Skertich, who said her husband had to be present—something
Swanson suspected “was a ploy to discourage loan applications
from African-Americans.”23 When she later completed the application process with Skertich, “Skertich pointed to a photograph
on his desk and commented that his wife and son were part African-American.”24 After being rejected by Citibank, Swanson obtained an appraisal, which valued her home at $240,000.25
The central claim was for violation of the FHA, which among
other things prohibits racial discrimination in the provision or
use of appraisals.26 Eventually, the district court dismissed

discuss the literature somewhat in William H.J. Hubbard, A Fresh Look at Plausibility
Pleading, 83 U Chi L Rev 693, 694–97 (2016). For an example of more recent work on more
subtle doctrinal implications of Twombly and Iqbal, see generally A. Benjamin Spencer,
Pleading Conditions of the Mind Under Rule 9(b): Repairing the Damage Wrought by Iqbal, 41 Cardozo L Rev 1015 (2020) (arguing that Iqbal’s interpretation of Rule 9(b) ran
counter to the rule’s text and original purpose, and has harmed litigants by accelerating
case dismissals).
20 Swanson, 614 F3d at 402.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Swanson, 614 F3d at 402–03.
25 Id.
26 42 USC § 3605.
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Swanson’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6).27 Swanson appealed.
In the Seventh Circuit, she drew a unique panel of jurists:
then–Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook, Judge Posner, and Judge
Wood, all of whom were faculty at the University of Chicago Law
School. On July 30, 2010, the court reversed the dismissal of
Swanson’s FHA claims.28 Judge Wood authored the decision,
which Chief Judge Easterbrook joined.
It was barely a year since Iqbal. Judge Wood’s opinion began
by noting that Twombly “disapproved” of Conley, but that courts
“are still struggling” with the question of “how much higher the
Supreme Court meant to set the bar.”29 The court then took the
opportunity to expound on pleading generally. For now, I skip reciting the ensuing discussion of pleading standards, as I will
quote heavily from it in the remainder of this Essay. Returning to
the complaint before it, the court concluded:
Swanson’s complaint identifies the type of discrimination
that she thinks occurs (racial), by whom (Citibank, through
Skertich, the manager, and the outside appraisers it used),
and when (in connection with her effort in early 2009 to obtain a home-equity loan). This is all that she needed to put in
the complaint.30
Judge Posner dissented from the reversal of the FHA claims.
He argued that it was not “plausible” that racial discrimination,
rather than a merely mistaken appraisal, was the reason why
Citibank denied the loan application.31 Further, “[e]ven before
Twombly and Iqbal, complaints were dismissed when they alleged facts that refuted the plaintiffs’ claims.”32 His argument was
that Swanson had pleaded herself out of a claim. Her application
was based on her house being worth $270,000, Posner noted, but
her “house had been appraised at $260,000 in 2004, and the complaint alleges that home values had fallen by ‘only’ 16 to 20 percent since,” meaning that her house was worth less than

27

Swanson, 614 F3d at 403.
Id at 407.
29 Id at 403.
30 Id at 405.
31 Swanson, 614 F3d at 408 (Posner dissenting).
32 Id (citing pre-Twiqbal cases). See also id (“This case is even stronger for dismissal
because it lacks the competitive situation—man and woman, or white and black, vying for
the same job and the man, or the white, getting it. We had emphasized this distinction,
long before Twombly and Iqbal.”).
28
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$220,000.33 In other words, according to her own allegations,
Swanson had far less equity in her house than her application
claimed—making her request for a $50,000 home equity loan a
dead letter.
With Swanson’s FHA claims revived, the case returned to the
district court for further proceedings. After eighteen months of
discovery, and with a motion for summary judgment by the defendant pending, the parties reached a settlement. Pursuant to
the settlement, the case was dismissed with prejudice on March
12, 2012.34
***
In the decade since the Seventh Circuit’s decision, Swanson
has been cited over 1,300 times in judicial opinions.35 It has been
cited hundreds of times in secondary sources.36 And some civil
procedure casebook authors have taken notice. Casebooks give
Swanson varying amounts of attention, from a full-blown case
edit to a mere citation to no mention at all.37
II. LIFE AFTER TWIQBAL
With Twombly, Iqbal, and Swanson in the books, we can ask,
in a very preliminary way, what legacy they have. Twombly and
Iqbal were surprising cases that triggered concerns that they
would lead the federal courts to ramp up the dismissal of civil
actions. Swanson, in contrast, prompts no sense of alarm. It suggests that the story of doctrinal change after Twiqbal is one of
continuity rather than revolution.

33

Id at 409.
Notification of Docket Entry, Swanson v Citibank, No 1:09–cv–02344, *1 (ND Ill
filed Mar 12, 2012).
35 According to Westlaw, Swanson was cited in cases 1,393 times as of October 19,
2020, and 99.4 percent of the citations were positive. Westlaw search, citing references of
Swanson, Oct 2020 (over 98 percent of its out-of-circuit citations are positive).
36 According to Westlaw, Swanson was cited in secondary sources 328 times as of
October 19, 2020. Westlaw search, citing references of Swanson, Oct 2020.
37 See, for example, Barbara Allen Babcock, Toni M. Massaro, and Norman W.
Spaulding, Civil Procedure: Cases and Problems 361–69 (Wolters Kluwer 6th ed 2017) (full
case edit); Jack H. Friedenthal, Arthur R. Miller, John E. Sexton, and Helen Hershkoff,
Civil Procedure: Cases and Materials 592–93 (West 11th ed 2013) (note case); A. Benjamin
Spencer, Civil Procedure: A Contemporary Approach 481 (West 5th ed 2018) (cited). See
also generally Stephen C. Yeazell and Joanna C. Schwartz, Civil Procedure (Aspen 10th
ed 2019) (absent). Perhaps needless to say, I give Swanson a full case edit. William H.J.
Hubbard, Civil Procedure (Foundation forthcoming).
34
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It is now a decade since Swanson, and we have the benefit of
years of empirical work seeking to measure the impact of
Twombly and Iqbal on cases in federal court. The data indicate
subtle rather than dramatic change. Twombly and Iqbal led to a
greater frequency in the filing of motions to dismiss and the
amendment of complaints, but neither Twombly nor Iqbal precipitated meaningful changes in dismissals with prejudice, settlement patterns, or filing rates.38 There is some evidence, though,
of a small but statistically significant effect on dismissal rates for
complaints by pro se plaintiffs.39
In other words, Swanson better reflects the on-the-ground
legal reality than Twombly or Iqbal. This may seem surprising,
given that Twombly and Iqbal are Supreme Court cases and the
law of the land, while Swanson is merely one instance of a lower
court interpreting the high court’s rulings. But by the same token,
Swanson better captures the pulse of the federal courts. It was
decided by judges who must decide every case that comes to them,
and who see cases involving parties and circumstances far more
typical than blockbusters like Twombly and Iqbal. Indeed, in a
recent article, Professor Adam Steinman identifies and explains
this dynamic,40 and unsurprisingly, Judge Wood appears prominently in his discussion of the federal courts’ response to Twombly
and Iqbal. Importantly, he shows that Judge Wood is hardly alone
among judges in seeing continuity, not discontinuity, in the law.41
Swanson also invites us to consider how legal change reflects
something more like common law evolution rather than hierarchical command-and-control. Professor Edward Cooper made this
point back in 2012:
It would be easy to emerge from studying the Twombly opinion uncertain, or even bewildered, as to what is intended. . . .
But it is the Court’s own uncertainty. Hoping that something
might be done through initial evaluations at the pleading
stage to advance the Rule 1 goals of “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination,” the Court does not know just what
that something might be. Rather than attempt a firm answer,
it has invited the lower courts to carry on, more openly and
38 See generally William H.J. Hubbard, The Effects of Twombly and Iqbal, 14 J Empirical Legal Stud 474 (2017).
39 Id at 498–99, tbl 9.
40 See generally Adam N. Steinman, Notice Pleading in Exile, 41 Cardozo L Rev
1057 (2020).
41 Id at 1065–67.
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more freely than in the past, a common-law process of developing pleading standards.42
This is essentially the view of Twombly and Iqbal that Judge
Wood took even earlier in Swanson. Rather than overturning the
system of notice pleading, Judge Wood argued, Twombly and Iqbal were an invitation to clarify and refine three elements of
pleading doctrine:
The Court was not engaged in a sub rosa campaign to reinstate the old fact-pleading system. . . . Instead, the Court has
called for more careful attention to be given to several key
questions: [1] what, exactly, does it take to give the opposing
party “fair notice”; [2] how much detail realistically can be
given, and should be given, about the nature and basis or
grounds of the claim; and [3] in what way is the pleader expected to signal the type of litigation that is being put before
the court?43
It’s a brilliant work of rhetorical craftmanship: By its literal
terms, this passage defends the Supreme Court against those who
would accuse it of stealthily undermining the Rules. Yet in the same
breath, does Judge Wood sap Twombly and Iqbal of their force? According to Judge Wood, Twombly and Iqbal do not mark a revolution in pleading—they merely open a conversation with lower
courts about pleading standards. In reading this passage, one might
ask: Has Marc Antony come to praise Caesar, or to bury him?
I think it was neither: Swanson was not defiance—nor was it
compliance. Indeed, it could not have been either one. The opinions in Twombly and Iqbal are a muddle. They say things that,
taken literally, are either unhelpful or nonsensical.44 Thus, the
lower courts had no choice but to try to make sense of them and
to provide their own answers to questions left unanswered. It is
in this light that we can best understand Judge Wood’s reframing
of Twombly and Iqbal as part of a dialogue. The opinion defends
but also gently corrects the Supreme Court, in the spirit of one
who politely redirects the conversation when a friend says something that doesn’t quite make sense.

42 Edward H. Cooper, King Arthur Confronts TwIqy Pleading, 90 Or L Rev 955, 966
(2012), quoting FRCP 1.
43 Swanson, 614 F3d at 404, citing Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, 5 Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1215 at 165–73 (3d ed 2004) (introducing “basis or grounds”
phrasing).
44 See notes 59–64 and accompanying text.
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In the next Part, I show how the three questions Judge Wood
extracts from Twombly and Iqbal provide a framework for
organizing the doctrine on pleading. These three questions (albeit
in different order) frame a three-step inquiry that, in my view,
represents the simplest way to understand the requirements for
pleading under Rule 8(a)(2). This framework applies equally to
pleading doctrine before Twombly and after Iqbal, showing that
those cases do not mark a new pleading regime, although of
course they do mark an important doctrinal shift—an effort by
the Supreme Court to intensify courts’ attention on one step of
the pleading process. For students, Swanson thus sets the stage
for a discussion on pleading doctrine that offers some glint of clarity after the opacity of Twombly and Iqbal.
III. PLEADING IN THREE STEPS
The attention showered on Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal tends
to obscure the fact that pleading in a federal civil action is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Here, Swanson
rides to the rescue. Judge Wood reminds us, “Critically, in none
of [its] recent decisions . . . did the Court cast any doubt on the
validity of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To the
contrary: at all times it has said that it is interpreting Rule 8, not
tossing it out the window.”45
Swanson invites us to do what the Supreme Court hasn’t ever
quite done—sort out the doctrine to clarify both how to plead under Rule 8(a)(2) and where the hard doctrinal questions lie. In
this Part, I take a small stab at this. I call it “pleading in three
steps.” My goal is not a novel theory of pleading, but a framework
for making sense of pleading doctrine and practice, with a debt to
prior scholarship and special reliance on Swanson as a leading
example.46
The analysis begins with Rule 8(a)(2), which requires that a
complaint provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”47 This phrase can be
parsed into three requirements: (1) there must be “a short and
plain statement”; (2) the statement must be a statement “of the
claim”; and (3) the statement must “show[ ] that the pleader is

45

Swanson, 614 F3d at 409.
My approach is descriptive and doctrinal. I avoid important normative questions
about whether and how pleading should be more generous, or less generous, to plaintiffs.
47 FRCP 8(a)(2).
46
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entitled to relief.” These three requirements provide a textual
grounding for a three-step approach to pleading under
Rule 8(a)(2). This three-step approach incorporates the lessons of
Conley, Twombly, Iqbal, and (especially) Swanson, while (admittedly) leaving open important and contestable questions about
the precise contours of plausibility pleading. I call the three steps
the “story,” the “claim,” and the “basis”:
The Story. The plaintiff tells her story—“a short and plain
statement” that describes what happened.
The Claim. The plaintiff’s statement is “of a claim”—there
exists some law that provides relief for the plaintiff’s injury.
The Basis. The plaintiff’s story provides a basis for bringing
the claim—some “showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
These concepts should seem familiar. They are all based on
existing doctrine and academic commentary and correspond
roughly to what others have called “factual sufficiency” (under notice pleading), “legal sufficiency,” and “plausibility,” respectively.
A. The Story
Step 1 is for the plaintiff to tell her story. The complaint must
answer the question, “What happened?” The story is a summary
of the events during which the defendant interacted with the
plaintiff, and the plaintiff ended up injured in some way.
This is the essence of notice pleading, and nothing about the
requirement of a “story” has changed since before Conley or after
Twombly and Iqbal. The defendant must have notice of the actions
and events for which the plaintiff seeks to hold the defendant liable. Swanson asked, “[W]hat, exactly, does it take to give the opposing party ‘fair notice’”?48 As Swanson exemplifies, the complaint must give the defendant a sense of the who, what, when,
and where that motivate the plaintiff’s suit.49
Crucial here is that factual detail has no intrinsic value. It is
only necessary insofar as it serves to inform the defendant what
it is the parties are going to fight about. The defendant must be
able to tell that the plaintiff’s action is about this event on this
day that caused this injury, and not that other event on that other
day that caused that other injury.

48
49

Swanson, 614 F3d at 404.
See note 30 and accompanying text.
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Further, the “story” need not have any legal content. To tell
the story, the plaintiff need not allege “violations” or “wrongs” or
“breaches of duties” or whatnot. Indeed, for purposes of the
“story,” assertions of wrongdoing or legalese tend to diminish the
quality of notice to the defendant. This is why I tell my students
that a good pleading paints a clear picture of “what happened”
even for a reader who knows literally nothing about the law. Compare the following hypothetical allegations:
Example A: Defendant Acme Corp violated the Sherman Act
§ 1 by entering into agreements with its competitors in restraint of trade. Plaintiff Doe seeks damages for his injuries
from this concerted price fixing, which raised prices for all
consumers.
Example B: In February 2020, executives in the widget industry, including the CEO of defendant Acme Corp, held a
“Summit on Competition” to discuss product prices. On
March 9, 2020, Defendant Acme Corp. and other widget makers raised their prices for widgets by $5. Doe was overcharged
for his purchases from Acme after March 9, 2020.
Example A doesn’t answer the question “What happened?”
except in what the Supreme Court might call a legally conclusory
sense. It’s not that listing a cause of action isn’t helpful. (We’ll get
to Step 2 soon enough.) It is that the defendant cannot prepare a
defense when it doesn’t know when it allegedly restrained trade,
for what product, and when or how the plaintiff has a connection
to the defendant.
Example B, however, gives the defendant plenty to go on. The
defendant may believe that the facts as alleged are incomplete,
mistaken, misinterpreted, or even deliberately misleading. But
there is no question that from these few short sentences the defendant can glean what happened, what it is being accused of, the
injuries claimed, and how to begin preparing its defense.
Another example of a minimal, but adequate, story comes
from the old Form 11, which provided a template for an action in
negligence. A complaint using that form would look like this:
Example C: On March 9, 2020, at 60th Street and University
Ave, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle into the
plaintiff. As a result, the plaintiff was physically injured,
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suffered physical and mental pain, and incurred medical expenses of $5,000.50
To the eyes of a modern lawyer, these allegations contain virtually no detail. But they contain the detail that matters. The defendant knows what she has been accused of. But wait: Is the reference to “negligen[ce]” an allegation of “fact” or a “legal
conclusion”? It doesn’t matter! The defendant knows what the
fight is about: when, where, and how she allegedly injured the
plaintiff.
B. The Claim
Step 2 is to check whether the complaint describes an injury
that amounts to a legal wrong. In other words, the plaintiff’s injury must be one for which the law allows the plaintiff to obtain
relief in a civil action.
In most cases, this requirement is easily met. Gloria Swanson’s injury was being denied a home equity loan. Is that an injury for which the law gives redress? It is, if the denial was based
on racial discrimination. Indeed, Swanson cited a specific federal
statute—the FHA—that provides a right to bring an action.
Likewise in the examples above. In Example B, does charging
a higher price to a customer create legal liability? It does if the
higher price is the product of an agreement in restraint of trade.
In Example C, does driving a motor vehicle into someone create
legal liability? Yes, at least if a court finds you negligent. These
examples cite no law, but they don’t need to. Swanson posed the
question, “[I]n what way is the pleader expected to signal the type
of litigation that is being put before the court?”51 and the answer
today is the same as it was eighty years ago—the plaintiff need
not cite any law in her complaint.52
While the complaint need not explicitly state the law implicated by the plaintiff’s story, the plaintiff’s story must not rule out
the very type of relief that the plaintiff seeks. This is called
“pleading yourself out of court” and has been a basis for dismissal
of a complaint since long before Twombly and Iqbal.53 The argument in Judge Posner’s dissent in Swanson that Swanson pleaded
50

For the original version, see FRCP Form 11 (abrogated Dec 1, 2015).
Swanson, 614 F3d at 404.
52 See Johnson v City of Shelby, 135 S Ct 346, 346–47 (2014).
53 See, for example, Bennett v Schmidt, 153 F3d 516, 519 (7th Cir 1998) (“Litigants
may plead themselves out of court by alleging facts that establish defendants’ entitlement
to prevail.”).
51
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herself out of court rested on a ground for dismissal that predated
Twombly and Iqbal.54
Steps 1 and 2 together constitute what many scholars would
call “notice pleading”—the requirement under Conley that the
complaint “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s
claim is.”55 Giving fair notice of a “claim” requires notice of what
happened and what legal right is at stake. As then-Professor
Charles Clarke (the drafter of Rule 8) put it, a claim is “a group
of operative facts giving rise to one or more rights of action.”56 The
story provides the operative facts, and so long as those operative
facts suggest the law providing for relief, the defendant has fair
notice of the claim.
C. The Basis
Step 3 is to examine the connection between the story and the
claim. The plaintiff’s story must provide some basis for the
plaintiff’s demand for relief from the defendant. A complaint that
says, “I was injured, and you should pay,” must contain a story
that indicates why the defendant should pay. To be sure, the
pleadings need not prove that the defendant should pay. That is
what the rest of litigation is for. Rather, the story in the complaint
must suggest a reason to hold the defendant liable, rather than
blaming someone else (or no one at all) for the injury.
Litigation is stressful, time-consuming, and expensive. Presumably, a plaintiff (and her attorney, if she has one) won’t undertake the time and expense of suing unless they have reasons
for thinking that the defendant should be liable. These reasons
need to be articulated in the complaint; a complaint that cannot
even articulate why the plaintiff is suing this defendant for this
legal wrong doesn’t belong in court. After all, litigation is burdensome not only for the plaintiff but the defendant and the court as
well.57 It’s not too much to ask the plaintiff to include whatever
parts of her story might connect it to her claim. The difficult question is how strong that connection must be.
This question brings us to Twombly and Iqbal. So far, I have
discussed Step 3 without invoking these cases. This is because
54

For discussion of Judge Posner’s dissent, see text accompanying notes 31–33.
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quoted in Simona Grossi, The Claim, 55 Houston L Rev 1, 7 (2017).
57 I expand on this point in Hubbard, 83 U Chi L Rev at 701–04 (cited in note 19)
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Step 3 is not the product of Twombly or Iqbal, as I hope the discussion above makes clear. Long before Twombly, Conley reminded us that a complaint must give the defendant notice of not
merely the claim but also “the grounds upon which it rests.”58 The
fact that Twombly and Iqbal appear to have demanded a stronger
basis for the claim doesn’t change the fact that a basis has been
required all along.
What do Twombly and Iqbal tell us about how strong the
plaintiff’s basis for the claim must be? Unfortunately, most of
what they say is confusing and ambiguous. For example, what
does it mean for plaintiffs to “nudge[ ] their claims across the line
from conceivable to plausible”?59 And the Court’s insistence that
“well-pleaded factual allegations” but not “conclusory statements”
must be taken as true has sown rather than dispelled confusion.60
To illustrate, is the allegation of an “agreement” factual or conclusory?61 Further, some language invites nonsensical interpretations. When the Court in Iqbal said that plaintiffs’ allegations fail
to “plausibly” state a claim “given more likely explanations,”62 the
most literal reading—that plaintiffs’ account of defendant’s liability must be no less likely than any competing explanation for the
events alleged—is obviously wrong. This literal reading describes
the “super-heightened” pleading standard that applies only to allegations of scienter in securities fraud suits subject to the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).63 The Supreme
Court itself said so in Tellabs, Inc v Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd,64
a case decided exactly one month after Twombly.
Once again, Swanson comes to the rescue. With respect to
Step 3, Judge Wood reframes Twombly and Iqbal as a call for
courts to reexamine the question, “[H]ow much detail realistically
can be given, and should be given, about the nature and basis or

58

Conley, 355 US at 47.
Twombly, 550 US at 570.
60 Iqbal, 556 US at 678–79.
61 See, for example, Twombly, 550 US at 588–89 (Stevens dissenting) (“[T]he theory
on which the Court permits dismissal is that, so far as the Federal Rules are concerned,
no agreement has been alleged at all. This is a mind-boggling conclusion.”).
62 556 US at 681.
63 See 15 USC § 78u-4(b)(2)(A).
64 551 US 308 (2007). Tellabs is another pleading case in which Judge Wood had a
hand. Although Judge Wood has had the last word on plausibility pleading (so far), she
did not have the last word on pleading scienter under the PSLRA. The Supreme Court’s
opinion in Tellabs reversed her opinion for the Seventh Circuit. See generally Makor Issues
& Rights, Ltd v Tellabs, Inc, 437 F3d 588 (7th Cir 2006), revd, 551 US 308 (2007).
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grounds of the claim”?65 In answering that question, Judge Wood’s
opinion gives a helpful gloss on Iqbal: “‘[A]bstract recitations of
the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements’
do nothing to distinguish the particular case that is before the
court from every other hypothetically possible case in that field of
law.”66 In other words, rather than attempting the (at best) fuzzy
task of drawing a line between “conceivable” and “plausible” or
between “factual” and “conclusory,” Twombly and Iqbal demand
that a complaint contain allegations that distinguish this
plaintiff’s case from every other possible case, taking into account
the type of claims (the “field of law”) at issue.
To put it another way, a court should ask whether the plaintiff has distinguished this action from a hypothetical case brought
against a defendant the plaintiff had no reason to sue.67 Presumably, the plaintiff’s story contains something indicating what
made the plaintiff suspect that the defendant committed a legally
redressable wrong. Relative to the baseline of lawful and legally
innocuous conduct, the defendant did something that deviated
from this baseline, thereby creating a basis for the plaintiff and
the court to suspect wrongdoing. As Professor Robert Bone has
argued, “[W]hat the Twombly Court requires are allegations that
differ in some significant way from what usually occurs in the
baseline and differ in a way that supports a higher probability of
wrongdoing than is ordinarily associated with baseline conduct.”68
Compare Examples A and B above. One can say that Example A contains “bare recitals” and “conclusory statements,” but
the more helpful observation is that every complaint alleging a
Section 1 claim, including a groundless one, will contain essentially the same allegations as Example A. Exactly as Judge Wood
put it, this allegation does “nothing to distinguish the particular
case that is before the court from every other hypothetically possible case in that field of law.”69 Example B, in contrast, gives a
reason why this defendant has been singled out for a lawsuit alleging a violation of antitrust law. The allegations are far from
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proof of an antitrust cabal, but they raise suspicions with respect
to this defendant in this action.70
This approach to determining the sufficiency of a complaint’s
basis or grounds for the claim avoids (at least some) metaphysical
questions about the meaning of “plausibility.” It also makes sense
of Twombly’s dismissiveness of allegations that were “consistent
with conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of
rational and competitive business strategy.”71 Such allegations
neither raise nor lower the level of suspicion.
Of course, the “pleading in three steps” framework doesn’t
settle the question of how far from the baseline a complaint must
shift the level of suspicion. As I have described it, Step 3 requires
only that the plaintiff’s story be probative of the plaintiff’s claim—
in other words, that one’s belief that the defendant is liable for
the claim is strengthened (even a little) if the story is true. Perhaps Twombly or Iqbal require something more than this mere
quantum of probative value, at least in some circumstances. But
the Swanson court, in the circumstances of the Swanson case, did
not require more than this.
Nor does this framework eliminate the fact that there will be
hard cases. And indeed, part of what makes Swanson so illuminating is that it is best understood as a hard case.
IV. HARD CASES AND GOOD LAW
This brings me to my final point. Swanson is valuable because it is a hard case. To be sure, the judges who decided Swanson may not have thought it was a hard case. Judge Posner, in
dissent, made clear that he thought Swanson’s complaint easily
failed the plausibility pleading standard. But Judge Posner was
alone in dissent, and the court concluded that the complaint
stated a claim despite its far-from-compelling allegations. Could
Swanson’s complaint have alleged much less and still survived?
Maybe not. In this sense, Swanson was a hard case—it was a close
call, a borderline case. It helps us probe for the boundaries of permissible pleading—to see how far the deliberate liberality of federal pleading can go, even after Twombly and Iqbal.
It is clear enough that the complaint in Swanson passes the
first two steps above. As noted above, Swanson’s complaint gave

70 Example B is very loosely based on In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation, 630
F3d 622, 628–29 (7th Cir 2010), a case in which Judge Wood also participated.
71 Twombly, 550 US at 554.
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the who, what, when, and where of her story. She claimed racial
discrimination in home equity lending, which violates the FHA.
But what about Step 3? Does her story provide sufficient basis or
grounds for her claim?
We know the court said yes. Should it have? As Judge Posner
pointed out in dissent, it sure looks like Citibank denied her application because, as Swanson’s own allegations indicated, her
house was worth less than the amount claimed in her application—not to mention that her application was denied in February
2009, when hardly anyone was getting a loan.72 Indeed, a different
lender had already denied her loan application.73 Regardless of
whether Swanson had pleaded herself out of court, her own story
made her claim to relief implausible.
It’s hard to deny the premises of this argument. I doubt any
of the judges on the panel expected Swanson to ultimately win
the case, or even survive summary judgment. The case was a long
shot, and the most likely consequences of reversing the dismissal
were more time and money spent by all, and further heartache
for Swanson.
But we already know that Rule 8 does not require the plaintiff’s
claim to be the most likely explanation for the facts alleged. An
unlikely claim is an adequate claim, so long as the story provides a
reason to treat this claim differently from the thousands of nonactionable loan application denials that occur every day. The plaintiff
doesn’t have to prove her claim, but she does have to connect the
dots from her story to her claim. As Judge Wood put it in Swanson, “the plaintiff must give enough details about the subjectmatter of the case to present a story that holds together.”74 This
does not mean a “story that holds together” in the minimal, linguistic sense of being a coherent as opposed to an incoherent
story. (Even Conley, which required a pleading to give notice of
the claim “and the grounds upon which it rests,”75 demanded more
than linguistic coherence.) It means a “story that holds together”
as a basis for the plaintiff’s claim.
This is a low bar, but one that Swanson cleared. She had, after all, been preapproved by Citibank; the appraisal she later obtained was far higher than the appraisal Citibank commissioned;
and the loan officer who handled her application seemed eager to
72
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display his bona fides with respect to her race. Perhaps, Swanson
may have thought, the gentleman doth protest too much?
This was a slender basis for claiming race discrimination, but
it was something, and for two of the three judges on the panel, it
was enough. To me, it’s a genuinely close case. And the students
to whom I teach Swanson tend to think so, too. A lot of students
agree with the decision, and a lot side with the dissent. Either
way, though, they’re not entirely comfortable with the outcome in
the case.
***
In this way, Swanson brings us full circle to another classic
case on notice pleading, Dioguardi v Durning.76 In Dioguardi, the
plaintiff John Dioguardi filed a complaint, “obviously home
drawn,” making “a series of grievances against the Collector of
Customs at the Port of New York growing out of his endeavors to
import merchandise from Italy ‘of great value,’ consisting of bottles of ‘tonics.’” 77 He alleged that “when defendant sold the merchandise at ‘public custom,’ ‘he sold my merchandise to another
bidder with my price of $110, and not of his price of $120,’ and . . .
‘[that] two cases, of 19 bottles each case, disappeared.’” 78 After the
district court dismissed, Dioguardi appealed pro se. The Second
Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Charles Clark, reversed, concluding that, “however inartistically they may be stated,” plaintiff’s
allegations met the Rule 8 standard.79
Dioguardi has long stood for the liberality of pleading standards under the Rules. Its force comes precisely from the fact that
it was a hard case, in the sense that it involved a weak and obscure claim. It is not merely that the complaint was barely intelligible. It is that little indicated a legal wrong; it is hard to tell
whether the price at which the merchandise was sold, or the disappearance of the bottles, violated the legal duties of the collector
of customs. Nonetheless, the collector of customs had legal duties,
and the disappearance of merchandise is unusual rather than
usual. That was enough.
Dioguardi was a hard case in another sense. Judge Clark
surely had no illusions about Dioguardi’s likelihood of ultimate
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Id.
Id at 775.

2396

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:2377

victory in his suit. Judge Clark chided the district judge’s dismissal of Dioguardi’s complaint as “another instance of judicial haste
which in the long run makes waste,”80 yet he surely knew there
was a good chance that the greater waste would be a full-blown
trial consuming Dioguardi’s time and scarce resources only to end
in abject defeat. Was reversing the dismissal only prolonging the
inevitable? Only time would tell.81
The generous and liberal tone of Dioguardi contrasts with the
comparatively exacting and restrictive tone of Iqbal. Would Dioguardi come out the same way if it had been decided in 2010
rather than 1944? I think it would have come out the same way—
and maybe, in a sense, it did.
Swanson is the Dioguardi for our time. It presents the same
dilemmas. We have a pro se plaintiff whose complaint states a
claim, but just barely. More so than John Dioguardi, Gloria Swanson tells “a story that holds together,” but little in either plaintiff’s
story tends to inculpate the defendants. The “basis” for the claim
is awfully thin. And the plaintiff is proceeding alone and will
likely struggle to navigate the litigation process. The only redress
the plaintiff is assured of is that she gets to continue her proverbial day in court. For Judge Clark and Judge Wood, and for John
Dioguardi and Gloria Swanson, that must suffice.
This is perhaps the greatest gift Swanson provides to students of civil procedure. It offers no tidy narrative of aloof judges
giving a pass to big business run amok. Nor is it a tale of an underdog vindicated in the end against impossible odds. Swanson
instead occupies an uneasy space where the just result may be
unknowable, and all we can do is hope that our commitment to
fair process is justice enough.
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And it did. Twenty-one months later Dioguardi was before the same panel of
judges in the Second Circuit appealing his total defeat at trial. In a per curiam opinion,
the court affirmed, concluding that from “plaintiff’s own showing and the facts now of record, it is clear that his lively sense of injustice is not properly directed against the customs
officials.” Dioguardi v Durning, 151 F2d 501, 502 (2d Cir 1945).
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